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Abstract. In a contactless transaction, when more than one card is pre-
sented to the payment terminal’s field, the terminal does not know which
card to choose to proceed with the transaction. This situation is called
card collision. EMV (which is the primary standard for smart card pay-
ments) specifies that the reader should not proceed when it detects a
card collision and that instead it should notify the payer. In comparison,
the ISO/IEC 14443 standard specifies that the reader should choose one
card based on comparing the UIDs of the cards detected in the field.
However, our observations show that the implementation of contactless
NFC readers in practice does not follow EMV’s card collision algorithm,
nor does it match the card collision procedure specified in ISO.
Due to this inconsistency between the implementation and the standards,
we show an attack that may compromise the user’s privacy by collecting
the user’s payment details. We design and implement a malicious app
simulating an NFC card which the user needs to install on her phone.
When she aims to pay contactlessly while placing her card close to her
phone, this app engages with the terminal before the card does. Although
the terminal detects a card collision (the app essentially acts like a card),
it proceeds with the EMV protocol. We show the app can retrieve from
the terminal the transaction data, which include information about the
payment such as the amount and date. The experimental results show
that our app can effectively spy on contactless payment transactions,
winning the race condition caused by card collisions around 66% when
testing with different cards. By suggesting these attacks we raise aware-
ness of privacy and security issues in the specifications, standardisation
and implementations of contactless cards and readers.
Keywords: NFC payment, NFC phone, Contactless payment, Privacy
attack, EMV, Card collision.
1 Introduction
Near Field Communication (NFC) payment is already very popular. The statis-
tics show that as of February 2016, £1,318.3 m was spent in the UK in the month
using a contactless card. This is an increase of 19.1% on the previous month and
an increase of 306.8% over the year1. Apart from contactless cards, other types
1 theukcardsassociation.org.uk/contactless contactless statistics/
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of technologies for contactless payment are suggested to the users. Examples
include mobiles, tablets, watches, bPay bands, and bPay Stickers (bpay.co.uk).
In fact, there are more than 350 different types of NFC-enabled devices on the
market now2.
NFC technology is based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technol-
ogy. Security and privacy issues of RFID communication, and in particular NFC,
have been studied intensively in the literature. Contactless cards are always on
and a malicious reader in the proximity of such a device is able to trigger a
response from the card, without the user’s awareness. A number of security and
privacy violations have been reported in the literature exploiting such unautho-
rised readings [17]. More security attacks include different types of relay attacks
such as Man-in-The-Middle and Mafia attacks [18,21,30,35].
On the other hand, there are many works showing how malicious apps com-
promise user’s security/privacy by listening to different mobile sensor data via a
background process. Examples include accelerometer and gyroscope [13, 15, 22–
24,28,36], camera and microphone [31], light [32], and Geolocation [14]. Most of
these attacks work by accessing sensor data through a background process ac-
tivated by a mobile app, which requires installation and user permission. Users
normally install many different apps without even reviewing the app permis-
sions. Thus, even if there is a permission request from the users, they normally
ignore it [14]. This behaviour leaves the doors open for the attackers to obtain
access to sensors. In this paper, we also rely on such a behaviour; we develop an
app using the phone’s NFC functionality which the user needs to install.
Contributions. In this paper, for the first time, we show that the NFC func-
tionality on the victim’s mobile phone can be used to compromise her contactless
payment activities. This happens due to a particular situation in contactless pay-
ment which is called card collision or card clash. Card collision is the situation
when more than a contactless card (or NFC-enabled device) is available in the
reader’s field at the same time. Card collision has been explained and addressed
by EMV [10] and ISO 14443 [4]3, as the two main contactless payment references
for developers to implement the contactless systems. We study these standards
and propose attacks based on our findings. In particular, the contributions are:
– We explain the race condition caused by card collision and study the ap-
proaches suggested by EMV and ISO on this. We perform experiments to
discover the behaviour of contactless terminals when a card collision occurs.
The results show that the implementation on contactless terminals match
neither EMV nor ISO.
– We show that due to this inconsistency, it is possible to track the user’s
contactless payment activities, for instance through a malicious app. The
malicious app would have a chance to intercept payment messages and data
if the phone is closely located to the contactless payment card (Fig. 1).
We propose an attack vector following EMV contactless specifications by
2 nfcworld.com/nfc-phones-list/
3 For the rest of this paper, unless noted otherwise, by ISO standard we mean ISO/IEC
14443, and by EMV standard, we mean EMV Contactless Specifications.
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Fig. 1. Different card holder cases: flip wallet, back cover/stand, Opanable back cover,
sticker cover, transparent cover.
requesting the Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) from the ter-
minal when the malicious app wins the race and connects with the terminal
first.
– We develop an Android app and perform experiments to support our claim.
The results show that our attack can effectively break users’ privacy and
discover the pattern of their contactless payment activities.
This research highlights vulnerabilities in the standards and implementa-
tions of contactless cards and readers when a collision occurs in a contactless
transaction.
2 Card Collision
In this section, first we present a real-world example of card collision which is
called Card Clash by Transport for London (TfL) [34]. Next, we explain the
approaches suggested by EMV and ISO to handle card collision.
2.1 Oystercard and Bank Card Clash
Card clash is a well-known phenomenon for a metro traveller. For example in
the London metro, a traveller can either use an Oystercard or a contactless bank
card4 to pay for her journey. While swiping a wallet containing Oystercard and
bank cards, the reader gets confused and does not know which card to take
payment from. This causes discomfort for the users as follows [33,34]:
– The commuter might inadvertently pay for her travel with a card she did
not intend to use.
– The reader might refuse to work under this situation and the gate won’t
open.
– The passenger could be charged two maximum fares for the same journey.
This happens when the reader charges one card when she touches in and
another card when she touches out.
4 In the rest of this paper unless noted otherwise, by bank card we mean contactless
payment card.
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– Even if the reader selects the contactless bank card over Oystercards for both
start and end of journey, the passenger might end up being charged two times
since she has already paid for a weekly travelcard on the Oystercard.
The only way to find out if any card clash happened is to sign into the user
online accounts and check records of payment. If the user has been charged a
maximum fare on two separate cards for the same journey, she can apply for a
refund provided by TfL [34]. In fact, when TfL introduced card payments as an
additional payment method to paper tickets and Oystercards in September of
2014, a huge number of double payments occurred in just a few weeks. Many
of those were automatically refunded within 3-5 working days. TfL has auto-
matically handed back about £300,000 to about 50,000 customers, with refunds
averaging £5.93. Although the Card Clash issue was publicised very well, sur-
prisingly, TFL estimates that around 1,500 instances of it are occurring every
day [25]. Accordingly, different solutions have been suggested to passengers to
avoid card clash [16,20,25,33] which include:
– To choose the card that you want to pay with and take it out from the wallet.
– To register the Oystercard online, so that you can regularly check the online
account for auditing.
– To check your bank statements regularly to find out if you have been charged
on the wrong card.
– In the case of a double payment, to claim the refund by applying to the TfL
website.
– To use protective cases for your contactless cards that you do not aim to
pay with. Actually, Metro Bank gives free card protectors out to all of its
customers.
– To switch to contactless payments. TfL has fixed the problem of weekly
travelcards by applying them automatically both on Oystercards and con-
tactless bank cards. Hence, the cost would not differ that much if a passenger
switches to a contactless bank card. There are reports which show that it is
even cheaper if costumers move to contactless bank cards [29].
– To use a Barclaycard contactless bPay wristband (bpay.co.uk) and pay with
a wave of your hand. Any UK Visa or MasterCard debit or credit card can
be linked to the bPay wristband.
Among the above solutions, those which suggest to replace the Oystercard by
contactless cards or bands seem more user friendly. However, not all passengers
are happy with paying for a bPay and wearing it all the time. On the other
hand, people normally carry multiple bank cards. Hence even in the absence of
the Oystercard, other contactless cards are still subject to card clash. Therefore,
we believe that a fundamental approach is needed to overcome this real-world
problem.
2.2 EMV contactless Specifications
EMV is the primary protocol standard for smart card payments. The EMV stan-
dards are managed by EMVCo (emvco.com), a consortium of multinational com-
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Fig. 2. Terminal Main Loop, taken from EMV contactless Book D.
panies such as Visa, MasterCard, and American Express. EMV has specifically
defined specifications for contactless payment in books A, B, C and D [6–10].
ISO/IEC 14443 on the other hand, is an international standard that defines
proximity cards used for identification, and the transmission protocols used for
communication between the card and host. Generally, there are two ISO/IEC
14443 communication signal interfaces: Type A and Type B. They use different
Radio Frequency Field (RF) modulation methods for the Proximity Coupling
Device (PCD, Reader) to Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (PICC, Card) and
the PICC to PCD communication. In this paper, the focus is Type A, which is
the mainstream technology [26]. Android supports it, and all of our tested bank
cards are Type A.
EMV Contactless Book D [10] defines Collision as follows: “Transmission by
two or more PICCs in the same PCD energizing field and during the same time
period, such that the PCD [reader] is unable to distinguish from which PICC
[card] the data originated”. Based on this definition, in different parts of EMV
documents, the aim is to describe how EMV anti-collision mechanism handles
the situation when there is more than a card in the field. Here we generally
review the whole process for a contactless transaction from the reader’s point of
view.
According to EMV contactless Book D [10], the terminal is constantly run-
ning a main loop as illustrated in Fig 2. In the polling phase, the reader ensures
that there only exists one type of technology (Type A or B) in the field by using
Wake UP command e.g., WUPA for type A. Then it checks if there is only one
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card from the same technology in the field. If so, it activates the card. Remem-
ber that contactless bank cards are passive, and the reader creates an energising
RF (the operating field) that enables the card to power up. Next, the terminal
application performs the transaction.
On the other hand, if there exists more than a card in the field, a collision is
detected. Accordingly, the terminal will not initiate a transaction in this situa-
tion. The collision detection procedure is applicable either on different technolo-
gies (Type A, B, and others), or on multiple cards from the same technology. If
more than one technology is in the field, the reader must report a collision, reset
the operating field, and return to the polling phase. For Type A collision detec-
tion, the terminal performs a specific procedure as follows (illustrated in Fig. 5;
see Appendix B). Type A cards respond to Wake UP command synchronously
using Manchester coding. This allows the terminal to detect the collision in the
bit level. After the terminal waits for an interval tp, it sends WUPA command.
In all parts of this algorithm, if the terminal detects a transmission error in re-
sponse to the WUPA and Anti-Collision (AC) commands, it reports a collision,
resets, and returns to the polling procedure. Otherwise, the reader sends an AC
command which is used to obtain the complete UID of a Type A card, and to
detect whether more than one Type A card is in the field. Depending on the
UID size of the card, the response to the AC is different. In summary, regardless
of the card collision procedure, according to EMV, once a collision is detected,
the terminal should not proceed any more; instead it should reset the field and
go back to the polling procedure.
2.3 ISO/IEC 14443
Payment cards (contact and contactless) are based on ISO/IEC 7816 [12] and
ISO/IEC 14443 [2–5]. Mobile NFC payment technologies, such as Android Host-
based Card Emulation (HCE) [1], are also based on ISO/IEC 14443, which is
an international standard in four parts, defining the technology-specific require-
ments for proximity cards [2–5]. The third part of this standard [4], namely,
Part 3: Initialization and anticollision, presents the same definition for collision
as EMV. However, handling collision is different as we explain (presented in Fig.
6, see Appendix B).
In this standard, anticollisions are detected based on conflict in the bits of
the UIDs (started from uid0 as the most significant byte). The least significant
bit (LSB) of each byte is transmitted first. As an example, consider two cards as
follows. Card 1: UID size = 4 bytes (single), value of uid0 =‘10’, and Card 2: UID
size = 7 bytes (double). After both cards respond to the reader’s command, the
terminal performs the first cascade level for the anticollision loop. As response
the first card sends back the four UID bytes (uid0 uid1 uid2 uid3) plus some
extra data. However since the second card’s UID is double, it sends back the
cascade tag (CT) and the first three bytes (‘88’ uid0 uid1 uid2), plus some
extra data. Hence the bits received in the terminal side are: (00001000)b and
(00010001)b, respectively. If the implementation pads (1)b (which is what a
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Card Technology UID UID0 UID0 ISO
size Hex Binary (LSB) winner
TSB visa debit- Card 1 A 4 0x35 (10101100)b 3
TSB visa debit- Card 2 A 4 0x65 (10100110)b 7
Barclays visa debit- Card 1 A 4 0xE7 (11100111)b 3
Barclays visa debit- Card 2 A 4 0x87 (11100001)b 7
barclaycard Platinum visa - Card 1 A 4 0x67 (11100110)b 7
barclaycard Platinum visa- Card 2 A 4 0xDF (11111011)b 3
Nexus 5 A 4 x08 (00010000)b 7
Table 1. Cards’ information, LSB: Least Significant Bit
typical implementation does [4]) to the previous similar bits, the terminal chooses
the second card over the first one and continues with it.
As it can be seen unlike EMV, ISO specifies no termination in the case
of a collision. Instead, a race condition is created in which depending on the
implementation of the terminal, and the UIDs of the cards available in the
field one card would be selected. This inconsistency between EMV and ISO
perhaps would cause confusion when it comes to practical implementations of
these systems. We believe this is an important issue and should be addressed by
the community.
3 Experiments on Contacless Readers in Practice
In this section, we examine the anticollision procedure on the contactless termi-
nals implemented in practice. We already know that in the case of a card clash
in the London metro system, the card reader may either not proceed or pick one
card over others without any particular pattern [34]. It is also reported that the
cards that are picked up at the start and the end of a journey may be different
(in this case the passenger can apply for a refund). This explanation by TfL
suggests that the implementation in practice is not consistent with either EMV
or ISO. To investigate this issue further, we performed an experiment to observe
how payment terminals handled card collision in practice.
Before running the experiment, we tested the NFC chipsets on the cards and
the phones that we used in our experiments by writing a reader app using the
getId() function5. Our Nexus 5 mobiles returned random 4-byte UIDs which
always start with ‘08’. The first byte represents the brand of the technology [27].
All our tested bank cards including TSB visa debit, Barclays visa debit, and
barclaycard visa have fixed 4-byte UIDs, as presented in Table 1.
In this experiment, we examined three pairs of contactless cards as presented
in Table 1. Each pair has been requested and issued from the same banks and
roughly at the same time. (The two TSB visa debit, and the two Barclays visa
debit, were requested at the exact same time, and the two barclaycard Platinum
5 developer.android.com/reference/android/nfc/Tag.html#getId
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No. POS Issuing bank Facing card Result Note
to reader
1 MS 1, POS 1 TSB Card 1 No operation
2 MS 1, POS 1 TSB Card 2 No operation
3 MS 2, POS 1 TSB Card 1 No operation
4 MS 2, POS 1 TSB Card 2 No operation
5 MS 1, POS 2 TSB Card 1 No operation
6 MS 1, POS 2 TSB Card 2 Card 1 won msg1
7 MS 1, POS 2 TSB Card 1 Card 2 won on 2nd try msg1
8 MS 2, POS 2 TSB Card 2 Card 1 won
9 MS 2, POS 2 TSB Card 1 No operation
10 MS 2, POS 2 TSB Card 1 No operation
11 MS 1, POS 2 Barclays Card 2 Card 1 won
12 MS 1, POS 2 Barclays Card 1 Card 2 won
13 MS 1, POS 2 Barclays Card 2 Card 1 won msg1
14 MS 1, POS 2 Barclays Card 1 Card 2 won
15 MS 2, POS 1 Barclays Card 2 Card 1 won
16 MS 2, POS 1 Barclays Card 1 Card 2 won msg1
17 MS 2, POS 1 Barclays Card 2 Card 1 won msg1
18 MS 1, POS 3 barclaycard Card 2 Card 1 won
19 MS 1, POS 3 barclaycard Card 1 Card 1 won
20 MS 1, POS 3 barclaycard Card 2 Card 1 won
21 MS 1, POS 3 barclaycard Card 1 Card 1 won
22 MS 2, POS 2 barclaycard Card 2 Card 1 won
23 MS 2, POS 2 barclaycard Card 1 Card 1 won
24 MS 1, POS 1 barclaycard Card 2 Card 1 won on 2nd try msg2
25 MS 1, POS 1 barclaycard Card 1 Card 1 won
26 MS 2, POS 3 barclaycard Card 2 Card 1 won
27 MS 2, POS 3 barclaycard Card 1 Card 1 won
Table 2. The results of putting card pairs in the race condition. MS stands for Metro
Station. In the case of No operation, the cards were presented 3 times to the POS for
the same transaction. msg1: ”Only present one card”, msg2: ”Card read failed”.
visa, were requested and received within a month. The TSB card 1 had been in
use more than card 2, and the barclaycard card 2 had been in use much more
than card 1.) We presented each pair to different contactless terminals several
times in order to put them in race conditions. We made sure that both cards were
attached to each other from the same side -contactless chipsets on each other.
More specifically, when tapping the cards together to the reader, we put one of
the cards on top of the other one for half of the experiments, and exchanged
them for the rest of the tests.
The results are presented in Table 2. As it can be seen, these results do
not match the anticollision algorithms suggested by either EMV or ISO. Gen-
erally, we can not find any specific pattern in the behaviour of these terminals
when facing more than a card. Interestingly, in a few cases, the terminal shows
this message: “only present one card”, yet it proceeds with the payment. Based
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on this observation, in the next sections, we demonstrate an attack which can
compromise user’s privacy.
4 Attack Design
In this section, first we present the context of the attack. Then, we explain the
feasibility of our attack by designing it based on the existing contactless payment
specifications.
4.1 Threat Model and Attack Scenario
The context of this attack is when a user aims to pay for something by her
contactless card where her card and phone are close to each other and both
are presented to the reader’s field. If the phone manages to hijack a few initial
NFC signals that the card is meant to receive from the terminal, the attack is
successful. In this situation, the phone is able to learn a lot about this contactless
payment by requesting PDOL data (details in section 4.2). The data can then
be sent to a remote server controlled by the attacker. However, the malicious
app would not continue further communication with the reader at some point
(since it does not simulate the entire payment) and the user would realise that
the payment is not being processed. In order to not disappoint the user on her
second effort to pay, the NFC service on the mobile should be turned off for a few
minutes once it hears from the reader. In this way, the user is able to complete
the payment on the second try.
There are different ways in which the user might keep her card very close to
her phone. For example, different models of card holder mobile cases are available
in the market now. These cases are capable of containing a few cards as shown
in Fig 1. These types of wallets are already very popular with users since they
offer an easy way to travel light and keep wallet essentials close to hand. When
it comes to contactless payment, these accessories are even more popular since
the users do not even need to take the card out of the case. Users can slide their
contactless card that is kept inside the mobile case and easily tap it against the
reader for daily purchases. After the increase of the cap limit from £20 to £30 in
2015, more retailer shops started to accept contactless payments for small item
purchases6.
Third parties are very interested in this sort of information, e.g., for ad-
vertising purposes. The collected information could be used in several ways.
Third parties normally stimulate the users to purchase items by providing them
customized ads based on this information. In addition, they can perform data
mining programs to extract the patterns of people’s shopping behaviours. An
advanced attack might even pretend to be the user’s bank by presenting this
shopping information to her and tricking her to reveal her credentials via social
engineering techniques. This attack in this paper can be even more impactful if
6 theukcardsassociation.org.uk/Contactless (our views)/index.asp
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the malicious app turns into the reader mode and extracts the card’s informa-
tion as suggested by Emms et al. [17]. Once the information is extracted, the
app goes to the card mode for the rest of the attack. In this way, the attacker
can easily pretend to be the user’s bank by having her card information and her
shopping records. We believe that these sorts of information are private to the
users and should not be collected and shared without their permission.
4.2 Designing the Attack based on NFC Payment Protocols
In this section, we cover a few key points in relation to contactless payment pro-
tocols in which we are going to refer in our implementation. EMV Contactless
Book B [7] covers the Entry Point Specification. This specification defines the
reader requirements necessary to enable the discovery and selection of a con-
tactless application, and activation of the appropriate kernel for processing the
transaction. Different kernels are used for different Application Definition File
(ADF) names. (e.g., for a MasterCard ADF name, Kernel 2 will be used, and for
a Visa ADF name, Kernel 3 will be used.) Based on the chosen Kernel, different
procedures will run to complete a payment. However, the entry point protocols
are the same for all card schemes.
Entry Point is designed around the use of a Proximity Payment System En-
vironment (PPSE) as the selection mechanism. For multi-brand acceptance, this
allows a reader to quickly obtain all the available brands and applications with a
single command and to make an immediate choice based on priority and kernel
availability. The Entry Point command and response Application Protocol Data
Units (APDUs) are presented in Fig. 3. The File Control Information (FCI) as
the response to the PPSE command from the card side includes the Directory
Definition File (DDF) covering a product supported by the card, the Kernel
Identifier of the kernel required for the specific application underpinning the
product (conditional), and the priority of the Combination (conditional). The
product is indicated by its ADF name in the card. Hence, it is the card which
decides what kernel to choose and talk to. Entry Point finds Combinations by
matching pairs of data elements (ADF Name) and Kernel Identifier in the card
with pairs of data elements in the reader (AID and Kernel ID). Once all sup-
ported Combinations have been found and the highest priority Combination has
been identified, Entry Point selects the associated card application by sending
a SELECT (AID) command with the ADF Name of the selected Combination.
Depending on the selected AID and the kernel in the selected Combinations, a
specific kernel is called to take care of the rest of the payment.
As a part of the response to SELECT AID command, the card requests
Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL). Generally, a Get Processing Op-
tion (GPO) command is returned in response to this FCI command (SELECT
AID) which includes the Terminal Transaction Qualifiers (TTQ), Unpredictable
Number, Amount, Authorised, Transaction Currency Code, and other tags [11].
As shown Fig. 3 and we explain in the next section, our attack app is going
to take the proper action in response to each command from the terminal in
order to retrieve as much information as possible about each transaction.
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Fig. 3. The sequence diagram of the communication between our app and the reader.
5 Implementation
In this section we present the technical implementation of our attack.
5.1 Android HCE
Android supports emulating cards that are based on the NFC-Forum ISO-DEP
specification (based on ISO/IEC 14443-1 to 4) and processes Application Pro-
tocol Data Units (APDUs) as defined in the ISO/IEC 7816-4 specification. In
compliance with ISO/IEC 7816-4, each HCE application has an Application ID
(AID). This ID enables the reader app to select the correct service.
In our implementation, we declared an AID group including an AID filter
of a Visa card (0xA0000000031010) in an XML resource to be pointed by a
SERVICE META DATA tag in the manifest declaration. On the other hand, An-
droid does not interpret the PPSE selection command and, consequently, it does
not generate or send a list of available payment applications. Hence we have to
handle the PPSE command in the app. Typically, an HCE payment application
based on EMV standards would register for both: the payment application AID
and the PPSE ADF name. Note that from a protocol perspective there is no
difference between an ADF name and an AID, so we can register for it in our
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service XML file with an AID filter for the ADF name (“2PAY.SYS.DDF01”)
in its ASCII hexadecimal representation of 0x325041592E5359532E4444463031.
In the same file, we set the android:requireDeviceUnlock attribute to
false in order to avoid the user being asked for unlocking her device.
The HostApduService class is extended for implementing an HCE service
with two abstract methods: processCommandApdu and onDeactivated.
The former is called whenever the card receives an APDU from an NFC reader
and enables half-duplex communication with the reader. The latter is called
when either the NFC link is broken or the reader wishes to talk to another ser-
vice. According to EMV, the first two APDUs (SELECT PPSE and SELECT
AID) are for service selection. That is where we request PDOL, as shown in Fig.
3. After a successful service selection, the card and reader can exchange any type
of data. When the app receives the first GPO command including the requested
data, it logs the data in a file, and the attack terminates. Accordingly, our app
turns the NFC off by going to the flight mode to allow the user to complete the
purchase on the second try.
5.2 Android Flight Mode
Android does not offer any API for turning the NFC controller on/off program-
matically. Therefore, developers usually set the NFC settings in a way that
prompts the user to turn it on/off manually. In our attack, once our app hears
from the terminal, it needs to turn off the NFC, so that the user can success-
fully pay on her second try. One possible way to control the NFC adapter is
to change the phone’s airplane mode setting. However, only those apps with
the superuser permissions can change the Airplane mode setting which requires
WRITE SETTINGS and WRITE SECURE SETTINGS to be declared in the man-
ifest file. Starting from Android 4.2 , turning on/off airplane mode is not sup-
ported by android APIs any more. Hence, this part of our attack only works on
a rooted device.
On the other hand, this attack needs to keep the phone’s screen on since, at
the moment, NFC does not work when the phone is off [1]. An advanced attack
would turn the screen on only when the user wants to pay by using accelerometer
and gyroscope sensor measurements in order to recognise such a gesture. Li et.
al. in [19] show that it is effectively possible to use the tap gesture to unlock the
phone for NFC applications based on accelerometer data. By augmenting such
a gesture recognition feature to our code, we will have a complete application
that is able to compromise users privacy in contactless payments.
6 Experiments and Results
We performed an experiment by installing the app on Android phones (Nexus
5). We attached the card to the back of the phone in two different positions,
as shown in Fig 4. The position that the card was attached to the phone was
important in our experiments since it effected the results, as we explain later.
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Fig. 4. Contactless card attached to the phone in two different positions for the exper-
iments; A (left): the NFC chipset was down, B (right): the NFC chipset was up.
In all experiments, the back of the phone was faced to the terminal (hence, the
card was in a closer distance to the terminal than the phone).
6.1 Expected Results
According to the EMV specifications, regardless of the UID of the card and the
phone, the terminal should not proceed in the case of a card collision. ISO stan-
dards, however, suggest to opt one of the UIDs (typically with higher values) in
the race condition. The first UID byte (UID0) of mobile phones that we tested
is always ‘08’ (LSB: 00010000), and it is a single UID. As presented in Table 1,
all of our cards should always win over the phone if it is a typical ISO imple-
mentation. In the following experiments, we show that the expected behaviour
does not happen in practice, and the phone wins with a high probability.
6.2 Experiment A: Card and Phone Collision
In this experiment, we tested a few different contactless cards by presenting
each card with the phone to a few terminals (contactless metro ticket machines).
We tested multiple cards including two TSB visa debit, and two Barclays visa
debit on different machines. During this experiment, we asked a few users to
pay for metro tickets with different contactless cards that we provided to them.
These cards were attached to mobile phones (Nexus 5). These participants were
informed of the purpose of the experiment, but were not asked to follow any
particular procedure. We asked them to naturally pay contactlessly. We observed
the behaviour of the terminals as summarized in Table 4 (see Appendix A).
The results show that when the card is attached to the phone in position A
(the card’s NFC chipset is down), the phone can hear the reader’s signal first
with a very high probability. On the other hand, when the card’s NFC chipset is
positioned to the top of the phone (position B), the chance of the card winning
is slightly more than the phone. Nevertheless, an average user might put the
card in any of these two positions close to the phone. Based on our experiment,
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Sender APDU Command
Terminal 00A404000E325041592E5359532E444446303100 SELECT PPSE
Phone 6F3C840E325041592E5359532E4444463031A52A FCI
BF0C2761254F07A0000000031010870101501042
4152434C4159434152442056495341BF6304DF20
01809000
Reader 00A4040007A000000003101000 SELECT AID
Phone 6F4B8407A0000000031010A5405010424152434C FCI including
41594341524420564953418701019F38189F6604 PDOL request
9F02069F03069F1A0295055F2A029A039C019F37
045F2D02656EBF0C089F5A0531082608269000
Terminal 80A8000023832130000000000000000080000000 GPO including
0000000826000000000008261605230016126739 PDOL data
00
Table 3. Exchanged APDUs of experiment B
generally our app is able to recognise about 66% of the user’s contactless payment
activities. Over time, this success rate would allow the attacker to accumulate
information about the user’s contactless payment patterns.
Our observations show that contactless terminals present different messages
on the display based on the situation. When select to pay, it displays: “Insert,
swipe or tap for GBP 0.80” as the first message. If it can not choose either the
card or the phone it displays: “Card read failed”, and it goes back to the first
message. The fail message happened when our users tapped the card and the
phone very quickly, hence none of them were presented to the field for a sufficient
time. Similar to our experiments in Section 3, the terminal may show another
message: “Only present one card”, but it still proceeds with the transaction.
6.3 Experiment B: PDOL Data
In order to show the impact of the attack more visibly, we performed another
experiment. While purchasing a ticket, we presented our final app to a payment
terminal in a metro station. Our app logged the PDOL data of the transaction
and then went to the Airplane mode. We built our card app in a way that it
responded to the two SELECT commands – PPSE and AID – before asking for
PDOL data (see Fig. 3).
The exchanged command and response APDUs are shown in Table 3. As it
can be seen, when the card sends the second FCI, by sending PDOL tag (‘9F38’),
it requests different sort of information about the transaction such as the amount
(tag=‘9F02’, Amount, Authorised (Numeric)) and transaction date (tag=‘9A’).
Accordingly, the terminal responds with the first GPO command including the
requested items for PDOL (‘83’) i.e. amount (‘000000000080’ = 0.80 pence) and
date (‘160523’ = 2016 May 23) [11].
As it can be seen, the attacker can easily build such a table for all transactions
and discover the user’s payment patterns.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed a real world problem concerning the card collision
when making contactless payments. We studied the EMV and ISO standards
on card collision, and by performing experiments we discovered that the im-
plementation in practice matches neither of them. Based on this inconsistency,
we describe and implement an attack on the privacy of contactless payments. In
this attack, we simulated a card within an app and tracked the user’s contactless
payment transactions by requesting PDOL data from the terminal. When the
phone and the card are both presented to a contactless terminal, our app could
successfully win the race condition over the card in the majority of test cases.
Our findings suggest vulnerabilities in the current infrastructure which needs
to be addressed. More specifically, the results of our experiments show that
when tapping the terminal with more than a card, in most cases (Tables 2
and 4), the terminal does not even identify the card collision. Nevertheless,
even if the terminal identifies the presence of more than a card in the field
(by showing a message), it still proceeds with the transactions. The selection of
the card appears random. A countermeasure to this identified privacy attack is
updating the implementation of the payment terminals according to EMV’s card
collision algorithm: i.e., the process should not proceed when more that one card
is detected in the field. Updating some parts of EMV’s protocol and protecting
the PDOL data would also mitigate the introduced attack. Finally, the EMV
and ISO standards would need to be updated to have a consistent algorithm to
handle card collision.
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A Experiment Results
In this section, we provide the detailed results of our Card and Phone Collision
experiment. These results are presented in Table 4.
B EMV and ISO Flowcharts
The collision detection procedure of EMV specification and Anticollision loop
flowchart of ISO are presented in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively.
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No. Card Terminal Position Winner Msg
1 TSB 1 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
2 TSB 1 MS 2, POS 2 A Phone
3 TSB 1 MS 2, POS 2 A Card
4 TSB 1 MS 2, POS 2 A Phone
5 TSB 1 MS 1, POS 1 B Card
6 TSB 1 MS 1, POS 1 B Card
7 TSB 1 MS 1, POS 1 B Phone
8 TSB 1 MS 1, POS 1 B Phone
9 TSB 1 MS 2, POS 2 B Card
10 TSB 1 MS 2, POS 2 B Card
11 TSB 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
12 TSB 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
13 TSB 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
14 TSB 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
15 TSB 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
16 TSB 2 MS 3, POS 1 A Phone
17 TSB 2 MS 3, POS 2 B Card
18 TSB 2 MS 3, POS 2 B Phone
19 TSB 2 MS 3, POS 2 B Phone, 2nd try “Card read failed”
20 TSB 2 MS 3, POS 2 B Card, 2nd try “Card read failed”
21 TSB 2 MS 3, POS 2 B Phone
22 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 A Phone
23 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 A Phone
24 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 A Phone, 2nd try “Card read failed”
25 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 A Phone
26 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 A Phone
27 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 A Phone
28 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 B Card
29 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 1 B Phone
30 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 2 B Card, 2nd try “Card read failed”
31 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 2 B Phone
32 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 2 B Card
33 Barclays 1 MS 1, POS 2 B Phone
34 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
35 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
36 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
37 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Phone
38 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 A Card “Only present one card”
39 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 B Card “Only present one card”
40 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 B Card, 2nd try “Card read failed”
41 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 2 B Phone
42 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 1 B Card
43 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 1 B Card
44 Barclays 2 MS 1, POS 1 B Phone, 2nd try “Card read failed”
Table 4. Results of experiment A
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Fig. 5. Type A collision detection, taken from EMV contactless Book D.
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Fig. 6. Anticollision loop, flowchart for PCD, taken from ISO/IEC 14443-3.
